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NOTE
TALKING BACK TO CYBER-MOM:
CHALLENGING THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY
ACT OF 1996
Whether by accident or by design, sooner or later just
about any Internet surfer is likely to encounter material
that might be considered objectionable. In all cases, the
best option is supervision. 1
[It is the responsibility of parents and families in the
first place, and not Big Brother, to make these decisions
about what children should see.2
As Joe Kilshiemer's twelve-year old son's technological skills and
sense of independence age two or three years with each birthday, Joe
understands the impracticability of constantly monitoring what his son
views on the Internet.3 "Hardly a day goes by anymore when I am not
asked by someone if I: a) Have seen dirty pictures on the Internet; b)
know where to find dirty pictures; and, c) know how to keep kids away
1 Chuck Melvin, How Parents Can Control Content on Kids' Computers, PLAIN
DEALER, Sept. 23, 1996, at 5D (providing solutions on how to establish parental control over
what your child sees over the Internet); see also Doug Levy, Sex Ed Should Start With Parents,
USA TODAY, Oct. 28, 1996, at ID (quoting Dr. Marjorie Hogan of the American Academy of
Pediatrics urging parents to "[d]iscuss sexuality with children early, before they are bombarded
with sexual messages from the media.").
2 See Jack Kraft, Parents Should Keep Smut Off The Internet, MORNING CALL
(Allentown), Sept. 18, 1996, at B5 (quoting Stefan Presser, Director of the Philadelphia Chapter
of the American Civil Liberties Union).
3 See Joe Kilshiemer, Controlling Kids'Access To Unsavory Net Sites; Programs
And Features Abound To Help Parents Screen What Their Children See On The Internet,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 7, 1996 at El.
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from the steamy stuff."4 Well Joe, Congress, in its infinite wisdom, tried
to answer the third question for you.
The Communications Decency Act of 1996, which would have
made illegal, and thus, effectively placed a blanket ban over, all "obscene"
and "indecent" material transmitted over the Internet, was passed as a last-
minute addition to the Telecommunications Act of 1996.5 The
Communications Decency Act was passed in response to the increasing
amount of pornography available to children on the Intemet.6 Section 223
of the Act provided, in part, that:
[any person] in interstate or foreign communications..
by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
makes, creates, or solicits, and, initiates the transmission
of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication which is obscene or indecent,
knowing that the recipient of the communication is under
18 years of age ... shall be fined under Title 18, or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.7
The Act further provided that:
[any person who] in interstate or foreign communications
knowingly ... send[s] to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or uses any interactive computer
' Id. (discussing how "as the Internet grows more and more popular, so does,
unfortunately, its reputation for a less-than-savory side").
' The Communications Decency Act, or Title V of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, is codified at 47 U.S.C. A. § 223 (1996). The Act amends the Communications Act of
1934 and was signed into law by President Clinton on February 8, 1996. See infra Part IV. for
the Supreme Court's analysis into the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of
1996.
6 See Linda Greenhouse, Spirited Debate in High Court On Decency Rules for
Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,1997, at BO (quoting Deputy Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman
as stating "[t]he Internet 'threatens to give every child a free pass to every adult bookstore and
video store' with the click of a mouse").
7 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B).
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service to display in a manner available to a person under
18 years of age, any... communication that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual
or excretory activities or organs ... shall be fined under
Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.8
Needless to say, the Communications Decency Act was met with
great resistance from the American Civil Liberties Union,9 as well as
several publishers, creators, service providers,1" parent groups, libraries,
speakers, listeners, and users of the Internet." On the other hand, the Act
was overwhelmingly endorsed by President Clinton and Congress, as well
as the Family Research Council, 2 the Christian Coalition," the National
Law Center for Children and Families, 4 and other conservative activist
groups.15
This note focuses on the Constitutional issues surrounding the
Communications Decency Act of 1996. It explores the question of
847 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1).
9 See infra note 52.
'°SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 833 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (discussing the myriad
of plaintiffs who opposed the Communications Decency Act, and explaining the role of "Internet
service providers" and "online services" such as America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy who
provide fill access to the Internet for a monthly or hourly fee to "almost twelve million individual
subscribers across the United States").
" Id.; see also Dominic Andreano, Cyberspace: How Decent is the Decency Act?,
8 ST. THoMAS L. REv. 593, 602 (1996).
2Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 828 n. 4 (listing the myriad of groups who filed amici curiae
briefs in opposition and support of plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to
enjoin enforcement of § 223(a) and § 223(d) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996).
31d. See Marie A. Failinger, New Wine, New Bottles: Private Property Metaphors
and Public Forum Speech, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 217, 328 n.1 (1997).
'
4 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 828 n.4.
"Id.; see also Court Ruling Heats Up Debate Over Internet Indecency (CNN
television broadcast, June 15, 1996); see also Hiawatha Bray, Porn Battle Logs On; Activists
Vow to Get Obscenity OffLine, Despite Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 1996, at 37.
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whether the Act, as written, infringed upon the First Amendment 16 rights
of adults by preventing them from reading and viewing constitutionally
protected communications. Secondly, the note explores whether the terms
"indecent" and "patently offensive" are unconstitutionally vague under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 7 in that a violation of the
statute could have resulted in a fine and/or imprisonment. Part One of the
note will illustrate the workings of the Internet.' 8 Part Two will discuss
Congress' response to the influx of pornography available to children, 9 as
well as what opponents of the Act challenged, and did not challenge.20
Part Three will canvass the constitutional challenges to the Act set forth,
and review the Government's interest in censoring speech. Furthermore,
it will trace the Supreme Court's analysis of obscenity, indecency, and
patently offensive material, to determine whether the material the Act
sought to restrict is protected under the First Amendment, and whether the
Act was the best, or least restrictive way (i.e. infringes the least on the First
Amendment rights of adults) to prevent minors from viewing
inappropriate material.2' The note will specifically consider user-based
technology that is available to parents, but ignored by Congress.22 Part
Four will discuss the Supreme Court case of Reno v. ACLU,23 the
landmark case that decided the constitutionality of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996.24
"See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances").
17 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall be
.. deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law').
IS See discussion infra Part I.
"See discussion infra Part II.A.
20 See discussion infra Part II.B.
2 See discussion infra Part I.
22 See discussion infra Part H.
23 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
24See discussion infra Part IV.
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I. THE INTERNET
The Internet is a giant group of computer networks linked together
for the purpose of exchanging information.25 "The resulting whole is a
decentralized global medium of communications - or 'cyberspace' - that
links people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the
world."26 Because the Internet is decentralized (i.e. controlled by each
individual computer's operator), there is no central way to oversee and
control what is transmitted via the Internet.27
Individuals may access the Internet in a variety of ways. They may
use a personal computer that is connected to a computer network, which
is connected to the Internet, 2 or they may use a personal computer with
a modem to connect over a telephone line to a network that is itself
connected to the Internet.29 The most common example of such access is
through one of the major commercial services, which provides subscribers
with full access to the Internet for hourly or monthly fees." Once
accessed, individuals may communicate over the Internet through several
different mediums.' Individuals may electronically mail ("e-mail") 32
communications to one another or to a particular mailing list of
25 See generally ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830-31 (estimating the number of
host computers in the United States linked to the Internet to be greater than five million). The
Internet is derived from a military program called Advanced Research Project Agency, or
ARPANET, which was created "to enable computers opeiated 'by the military, defense
contractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to communicate with one
another by redundant channels even if some portions of the network were damaged in a war."
Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2334.
'Reno, 929 F.Supp. at 831 (stating that "[t]he Internet is an international system").
'ld. at 830, 843 (explaining that "[slexually explicit material is created, named, and
posted in the same manner as material that is not sexually explicit [thus] [o]nce a[n] [individual]
posts content on the Internet, it is available to all other Internet users worldwide").
28 Id. at 832-33 (listing the "variety of avenues to access cyberspace in general, and
the Internet in particular," including computers found at universities, libraries, corporations,
government offices, community groups, or computer coffee shops).
291d. at 832.
I01d. at 833.
31Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834-38.
3 I1d. at 834.
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subscribers. Individuals may also interact in "real time"34 or gain access
to information located on a different computer in a different location in
"real time" as if speaking on the telephone, regardless of where each party
is located.35 Finally, the most popular form of communication over the
Internet is "remote information retrieval;"36 the best-known form being
"The World Wide Web. 3 7
II. SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERIAL ON THE INTERNET
A. Congress' Response
For better or worse, sexual material is available on the Internet.
Like researching the history of the American Revolution on the Web, or
sending mom an e-mail telling her you love her, "[s]exually explicit
material is created.., posted [and accessed] in the same [easy] manner."38
Because of the Internet's decentralized design, once a user creates a
message or image, it is accessible "to Internet users around the world"
including children. In other words, a creator or sender of sexually
explicit material (or any material for that matter) cannot pick and choose
who may see his message or image.4" The result is that individuals who
33 Id.
'Id. at 835 (describing "real time" as immediate dialogue between two or more users
of the Internet).
35 Id.
36Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (defining "remote information retrieval" as "the search
for and retrieval of information located on remote computers").
37d. at 836 (stating that The Web functions as an information mega-database). Each
document within the database (whether it contains "text, still images, sounds, [and] video") has
an address or link making it easily accessible to any viewer. Id.
38 Id. at 844.
39Id. at 836, 844-45 (explaining that Web publishers may choose to restrict their sites
to only those individuals who have user names and passwords). However, many publishers open
their sites to the public audience, and they usually do, since open publication offers the
communication to the largest possible audience. Id. at 836.40Id. at 844.
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have no interest in receiving sexually explicit material may either receive
it or inadvertently be exposed to it.4
Studies suggest that pornography is running amok over the
Internet.4" In actuality, however, users will rarely enter a site containing
sexually explicit material unless they intended to do so. 3 Nevertheless, in
order to protect children from the harms of pornography," Congress, with
bi-partisan support, decisively passed the Communications Decency Act
of 1996.4' The Act, an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934,46
was a broad attempt to regulate (i.e. censor) material transmitted over the
Internet. 7 In addition to policing "commercial purveyors" of pornography,
the Act would have regulated communications amongst private
individuals. 8 Specifically, the law targeted the effects of obscene and
4' Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844 (including non-sexually explicit material as well).
42 See Laura J. McKay, The Communications Decency Act: Protecting Children
From On-Line Indecency, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 463, 470 (1996) (citing MARTY RIMM,
PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE; EVIDENCE OF THE LiNKs 1914 (1988) finding "83.5
percent of all graphics posted on Usenet, [a network with access to the Internet], are
pornographic"). See also Click, Click, and Suddenly You're in Pornland, NAT'L. J. 1339
(1995) (stating that "pornography is available in many forms in cyberspace"). But see Amy
Harmon, For Parents, a New and Vexing Burden, N. Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997 at A21 (stating
that "only about 3 percent of the commercial sites on the Web traffic in adult material").
However, in a recent survey of 10,000 households nearly 30 percent of those households visited
adult sites with 8 percent of those visits done by teen-agers. Id.
" ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844-45 (explaining that a warning precedes
virtually all communications containing sexually explicit images, and that according to Special
Agent Howard Schmidt, Director of the Air Force Office of Special Investigation, "the 'odds are
slim' that a user would come across a sexually explicit site by accident.").
" See McKay, supra note 42 at 473. There are alternative views on the effects of
pornography. Id. One view establishes a link between exposure to pornography and violence
against women. Id. The other view links "prolonged exposure to sexually explicit and violent
materials" with a numbness to violence, especially in children. Stephen J. Gould, The
Production, Marketing, and Consumption of Sexually Explicit Material In Our
Sexually Conflicted Society, 11 J. OF PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 135, 140 (1992).
4' 47 U.S.C.A. §223.
46 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223, (referring to the original June 19, 1934 act as "the
Communications Act of 1934").
47 See generally Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
48Id. at 922.
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indecent material on those under the age of eighteen and would have made
such communications illegal, while leaving protected much of the same
material transmitted by, and amongst, adults.49 However, therein lies the
dilemma; for it is impossible, in light of the manner in which the Internet
operates, to keep sexually explicit transmissions from children under the
age of eighteen, while still permitting adults ages eighteen and over to
view them.5" In effect, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 would
have enjoined individuals above the age of eighteen from engaging in
activity that the legislature and the Supreme Court have declared protected
speech for adults."
B. The Challenge to the Communications Decency Act of 1996
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") was the leading
opponent of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. 52 On February
8, 1996, the day the Act was signed into law, the ACLU moved for a
temporary restraining order to enjoin enforcement of the Act. The ACLU
claimed that the Act, on its face, was unconstitutionally vague, because
under the terms of the Act,53 an individual could not discern what types of
491d.
5
°SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854-56; see supra text accompanying notes 38-
41.
51Butsee 47 U.S.CA. § 223(e)(5)(A) and 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(B) (providing as
a defense to any prosecution under the Communications Decency Act, that "[any person who]
has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances
to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication... including any method which is
feasible under available technology, or has restricted access to such communication by requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification
number [shall not be held liable under the Act.]" Compare with infra notes 200-212 (discussing
the non-feasibility of such technology).
5 SeeReno, 929 F. Supp. at 827. The American Civil Liberties Union was the named
party to the suit, however, "plaintiffs [also] represent[ed] a broad range of individuals and entities
... including [the American Library Association, which originally filed its own complaint in the
Pennsylvania District Court], and parents, who sought to protect the rights of parents to decide
what is appropriate for their children to receive through interactive computer communications."
See plaintiffs complaint at 1,American LibraryAssoc. v. U.S. (No. 96-1458).
" 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (1996).
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transmissions could subject them to prosecution.14 In granting a temporary
injunction against enforcement of Section 223(a) of the Act, so far as it
related to the term "indecent," but not "obscene," Pennsylvania Federal
District Court Judge Buckwalter found the term "indecent" troublesome,
because it was doubtful whether "the word 'indecent' ha[d] ever been
defined by the Supreme Court."55 However, Judge Buckwalter denied the
ACLU's motion to enjoin enforcement of Section 223(d) of the Act,
finding it both narrowly tailored and well defined. 56 On June 11, 1996, the
ACLU and the American Library Association" moved for declaratory and
injunctive relief, seeking to proscribe enforcement of Section 223(a) of the
Act and the still viable Section 223(d) of the Act on First and Fifth
Amendment grounds.58 The ACLU claimed that the Act would
unconstitutionally abridge the First Amendment rights of adults and do so
even though there were less intrusive alternatives that would be more
protective of minors.59 The ACLU argued that although the Act was
probably intended to protect children from inappropriate material, the Act
would, because of the nature of cyberspace,6" "have the effect ... of
depriving adults of communications that are appropriate, and indisputably
4 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 861.
5 See ACLU v. Reno, 1996 WL 65464, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (granting plaintiffs a
temporary restraining order enjoining the government from enforcing § 223(a)(i)(B)(ii)).
56 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 858. Judge Buckwalter would eventually change his
standing on the issue of whether the statute is narrowly tailored. Id. After learning more facts,
Judge Buckwalter concluded that the defenses provided for the Act were unfeasible, thus failing
to narrowly tailor the restriction on speech. Id.
" Reno, at 827-28 (consolidating the first ACLU action with a second suit brought
by the American Library Association, Inc. seeking injunctive relief as to see. 223(d) of the Act).
58See also Shea, 930 F. Supp. 916 (discussing a second cause of action for injunctive
relief brought in New York Federal District Court on August 19, 1996). "[Pllaintiff, [Shea], [is]
an editor, publisher, and part-owner of a newspaper distributed exclusively through electronic
means [who] brings this First Amendment challenge to § 223(d) of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 [claiming that the Act is] unconstitutionally vague [and] overbroad .... "
Id. at 922. See also Computer Indecency Law Declared Void, 216 N.Y. L.J. 25 (Aug. 19,
1995).
59 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 855-56.6 See supra text accompanying notes 25-27, 38-41, 50-51.
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constitutionally protected, for them."6  Moreover, Congress, in enacting
the Communications Decency Act of 1996, ignored alternative, more
effective ways of restricting minors from viewing inappropriate material,
while ensuring access by adults to such material.62 The answer, according
to opponents of the Act lies in "user-based blocking technology."63 Such
technology enables parents, not the government, to censor what their
children see, while allowing them, as adults, to view material that is
constitutionally protected.64
Opponents of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 did not
wish, nor argue, that all speech transmitted via the Internet should be
protected by the First Amendment, and, thus, be made legal.6" The
communications at issue were only those that were not already proscribed
by existing law.66 Opponents of the Act did not seek to allow obscenity,
child pornography, harassing speech, or speech intended to entice or lure
61 Plaintiffs complaint at ], American Library Association v. U.S. (No. 96-1458).
Such speech, because of the broad language of the statute, could have included "works of
literature and art, information about health and medical issues, and examples of popular culture."
Id. It also includes robust human discourse about politics, current events, and personal matters
that may at times include harsh, provocative, or even vulgar language, all of which is
constitutionally protected for adults." Id.62 Id.
63 Id; see infra text accompanying notes 214-218, 224. America Online Partners
With Microsystems Software To Enhance Parental Controls; Provides Parents With Ability
to Block Inappropriate Internet Sites; Adds Thousands of Special Children 's Sites To Its
Award-Winning Kids Only Channel, PR Newswire, Sept. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, PR Newswire File (discussing the technology available that "provide[s] parents with the
option of restricting children only to those Internet sites pre-selected as the best for children and
adolescents").
fASeePlaintiffs complaint at 2,American Library Assoc. v. U.S. (No. 96-1458); see
also Touching Home, CHIc. SuN-TvlEs, Nov. 3, 1996, at 53 (quoting members of the American
Academy of Pediatrics advising parents to "'take control of sex education' [in order] to keep
children from getting the wrong messages from television, music and the Internet").
65 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 829.
66 Id. (recounting how plaintiffs were not challenging the statute's inclusion of
obscenity and child pornography already proscribed by law).
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minors into inappropriate activity, over the Internet.67 The contention was
solely over the infringement of the First Amendment rights adults already
enjoy.6
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Obscenity: The Case Law
1. Roth v. United States
69
For forty years, the Supreme Court has attempted to define the
parameters of obscenity and whether proponents of such material may be
held criminally liable, notwithstanding the First Amendment, for their
possession and/or promotion of obscene material.7" The first case that
addressed the issue of whether obscenity is within the scope of protected
speech was Roth v. US.7 Defendant Roth, a New York publisher and
seller, was convicted of mailing obscene advertising and an obscene book
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1461, the federal
obscenity statute.' In sustaining the federal law, the Court never actually
reached the question of whether Roth's materials were obscene.73 Instead,
'See Reno v. ACLU - Transcript of Supreme Court Oral Argument (visited Mar. 24,
1997) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/sctran.html>, at 20. Id. (recognizing that such
speech is not constitutionally protected).
See infra notes 189-90 (explaining the New York and Pennsylvania District Courts'
rulings on plaintiff's motions for temporary injunctions).
9 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
71 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1095-98 (12th ed. 1991).
71 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
71 Id. at 479-80. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Roth's case was joined with
Alberts v. California, 292 P.2d 90 (Cal. 1956), a case involving a violation of California's Penal
Code. Roth, 354 U.S. at 479,481.
71 See generally Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
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the Court, following its dictum in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire7' and
Beauharnais v. Illinois75 declared that obscenity, per se, is categorically
76
not protected under the First Amendment.77 In providing the Court's first
analysis into obscenity, Justice Brennan declared that obscenity is "utterly
without redeeming social importance. 7  However, in establishing the first
American standard of obscenity, the Court distinguished obscenity from
sex in artistic, literary, and scientific works.79 The standard was: "whether
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest."8 Such a standard was intended to safeguard sexual material
with "redeeming social importance. '"' The Court noted that "[s]ex, [as
opposed to obscenity, is] a great and mysterious motive force in human
life, [which] has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to
'4315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (explaining that there is just certain speech that does not
fall under the protection of the First Amendment, including "the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting words'); see GUNTHER, supra note 70, at 1069-70.
7'343 U.S. 250,256-57,266 (1952) (following Chaplinsky and applying a categorical
approach in determining that libel, like obscenity, was a realm of speech without protection
under the First Amendment).
76 See GUNTHER, supra note 70 at 1069-70 for a discussion on categorization. The
categorization approach, as opposed to the balancing approach, "on a wholesale basis find[s]
certain varieties of speech unprotected because the claim simply does not belong in the First
Amendment ballpark..." Id. at 1069. "The balancing approach, by contrast, asserts ... that
a very broad range of expression is presumptively within the First Amendment and can be found
unprotected only after the restrictions are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny .... Id at 1070.
See also infra notes 145-46.
"Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-85.
78 Id. at 484.
79 Id. at 487. The standard in Roth refined the English standard set forth in Regina
v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (judging obscene material by the effect of the material "upon
[the most] susceptible persons"). See Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89 (quoting the Hicklin decision).
The Roth standard, instead, measured obscene material by contemporary community standards.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89.
go Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. The Court utilized WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1949) to define prurient, "in pertinent part, as [] [i]tehing; longing; uneasy
with desire or longing; of persons, having itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire,
curiosity or propensity, lewd ... ." Id. at 487 n.20.
8' Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
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mankind through the ages."82 Having found the lower court to have
sufficiently applied the standard, the Supreme Court sustained the validity
of the federal statute and Roth's conviction.83
2. Miller v. California
For nearly twenty years, American courts applied the standard
enunciated in Roth.84 However, the courts struggled with the national
standard set forth in Roth, for its failure to account for geographic
diversity lead to inconsistent convictions and confusion. 5 In Miller, Chief
Justice Burger seized the opportunity to clarify the deficiencies of Roth
and established a modem analysis bearing in mind the local interest.8 6 In
Miller, the appellant was convicted under Califomia Penal Code Section
311.2(a) 7 for mailing five unsolicited brochures advertising the sale of
adult material.88 In reviewing the conviction, Justice Burger modified the
categorical approach of Roth and substituted a new standard, enabling
lower courts to more readily identify obscenity. 9 The Miller test provides
the following guidelines in determining whether material is obscene:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
82 Id. at 487.
"' Id. at 489. Roth signified the Court's adoption of this standard as the one to be
applied in assessing the validity of both state and federal obscenity statutes. GuNTHER, supra
note 70, at 1103. In dissent, Justice Harlan vehemently opposed Roth's conviction noting the
important distinction between the power of the state to police morality, safety, and welfare and
the federal government's lack of authority to regulate in this area. Roth, 354 U.S. at 498, 503-
06 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" See GUNTHER, supra note 70 at 1096.
85 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32-33 (1973).
86 Id. at 30-34.
'Id. at 16. The California obscenity statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a), made the
distribution of obscene matter a misdemeanor. Id.
'Id. at 18 (describing the material as "explicitly depicting men and women in groups
of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently
displayed").
'9 Id. at 24.
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community standards' would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.9"
Thus, the courts could now, more readily, distinguish between protected
and unprotected (i.e. obscene) material.9 This standard, unlike the Roth
standard, narrowly defines "prurient," and considers the context in which
the material is presented, in order to further safeguard against the
restriction of material that might otherwise be threatened under the Roth
standard.92 Furthermore, the Court recognized the inadequacy of the
national standard of Roth and replaced it with a local standard, thus
remedying the ambiguities inherent in the national standard approach. 3
As a result, the community standard for each locality dictates what
materials are deemed prurient or patently offensive, thus accommodating
the nation's moral diversity.94
90 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
91 Id.
'Id. at 26 (providing the example of "medical books... necessarily us[ing] graphic
illustrations and descriptions of human anatomy").
93 Id. at 32 (explaining that a law interpreting the First Amendment to require "the
people of Maine or Mississippi [to] accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las
Vegas, or New York City" is not a "constitutionally sound" law).
94 Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 (providing the following examples of patently offensive
material a state may consider disallowing: "a) [R]epresentations or descriptions or
representations of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. b)
[R]epresentations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of
the genitals").
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B. Offensiveness and Indecency: The Case Law
1. Cohen v. California9'
As opposed to the "fighting" words held unprotected by the First
Amendment in Chaplinsky96 and speech "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action" in Brandenberg v. Ohio,97 there is certain
language that poses no immediate danger, but, instead, inflicts
"psychological or emotional injury" on its captive audience.98 Cohen
signifies "the [Supreme] Court's first major encounter with the offensive
language problem."99 Defendant Cohen "was convicted.., of violating
... California Penal Code, § 415, which prohibit[ed] '[thelmalicious and
willful disturbing [of] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person
... by ... offensive conduct... ."'00 On April 26, 1968, Cohen walked
through the corridor of the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a
jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." 01 Justice Harlan noted that
Cohen's conviction "rest[ed] upon the asserted offensiveness of the words
Cohen used to convey his message to the public."'0 2  However, the
offensive words, according to Justice Harlan, constituted speech, not
conduct, and thus, Cohen's conviction could not be sustained.'0 3 The
Court also felt that the statute under which Cohen was convicted was too
9403 U.S. 15 (1971).
'See generally Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (holding that certain words that are
likely to cause "an immediate breach of the peace" or "which by their very utterance inflict
injury" are categorically outside the protection of the First Amendment).
" Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447,449 (1969) (adopting Justice Holmes'
"clear and present danger" test to determine the scope of First Amendment protection to be given
to advocacy speech as expressed by Justice Black who concurred with the Court's opinion).
9" See GUNTHER, supra note 70, at 1137-38.
99Id.
100 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16.
101 Id.
02 Id. at 18 (emphasis in original).
1
"Id. Justice Harlan looked to the text of the California ordinance which prohibited
"conduct" and not "speech" that breached the peace. Id. at 16 & n.l. Having found Cohen's
expression speech and not conduct, the Court reversed his conviction. Id. at 26.
N.Y.L. SCH. J.,HUM. RTS.
ambiguous to sustain his conviction, because it failed to "put [Cohen] on
notice that certain kinds of otherwise permissible speech or conduct would
nevertheless, under California law, not be tolerated in certain places.""°4
The Court also distinguished this case from the obscenity cases, because
the expletive at issue would not ordinarily yield an erotic image in the mind
of the individual who read it.' 5 Most importantly, the Court stated that
Cohen was neither trying to incite others in the courtroom to violence, nor
wearing the jacket with the intention of personally insulting anyone who
might see it."' The Court refusing, however, to categorically protect all
speech, balanced the state's interest in protecting those offended by
offensive speech against an individual's constitutional right to free
expression.0 7 The Court, weighing the two interests, held that the state's
interest in protecting captive audience members from the injury resulting
from exposure to indecent speech was not substantial, since people in the
Los Angeles courthouse could have easily looked the other way and
avoided seeing Cohen's questionable display.'0" The Court noted the
difference between confronting individuals with noxious or offensive
displays in the privacy of their own homes and subjecting people to such
a display in a public courthouse."° While an individual does not anticipate
being confronted with such offensive displays in his home, an individual
in the latter group, because of the nature of the public setting, should be
more expectant of displays that may be offensive to him.1 10 Thus, the
burden fell on the audience to "avert[] their eyes" and not on Cohen to
censor himself."'
14 Id. at 19.
o Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (noting offensive and indecent speech, unlike obscenity, is
not categorically unprotected by the First Amendment).
106 Id.
1071d. at 21-22.
"I Id at 15 (stating that "the First... Amendment[] ha[s] never been thought to give
absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he pleases .... thus,
opening the door to a potential restriction, but not proscription, on speech) (emphasis added).
'
09 Id. at 21-22.
"o Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22.
111 Id.
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2. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville"'
In Erznoznik, the Supreme Court expounded upon the First
Amendment protections afforded to offensive and indecent material." 3
Erznoznik, following the Cohen approach, invalidated Jacksonville
Municipal Code § 330.313,114 which prohibited drive-in movie theaters
with screens facing the public highways from showing movies containing
nudity." 5 The City of Jacksonville offered various justifications in attempt
to defend the ordinance." 6 The City first claimed a great interest in
protecting individuals against unsolicited, offensive material." 7
Notwithstanding the interest, Justice Powell elucidated on the Cohen
approach and struck down the ordinance." 8 Justice Powell deciphered
between intrusion into one's home and exposure to offensive material in
the public domain, and held that such speech could only be restricted
when an intrusion occurs in the privacy of one's home, thus making it
"impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure."" 9
The second justification advanced in defense of the ordinance was
that the ordinance was intended to protect children from viewing
inappropriate material. 20 However, Justice Powell dismissed this claim,
finding the ordinance potentially overbroad in its application.12' Because
the ordinance prohibited the showing of all nudity, in effect, it barred the
12 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
1
3 Id. at 209.
14 Id. at 206 (prohibiting any drive-in theater from showing of "the human male or
female buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas .... ").
.. Id. The Court found the ordinance to be impermissibly content based before
deciding upon the indecency issue. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211-12.
"'Id. at 208, 212, 214.
117 Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208 (explaining that the city's primary interest was
"protect[ing] its citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that may be offensive").
.
8 Id. at 209-11 (citing Cohen).
'"Id. at 209.
"o Id. at 212. The protection of children, asserted as a secondary justification in
Erznoznik, has served as the government's primary justification in many subsequent First
Amendment challenges. See, e.g., Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 852.
"' Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 214.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
display of nudity not deemed inappropriate for children. 22
3. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation123
After Erznoznik, the Court began to move away from the
traditional blanket protection given to offensive and indecent speech.'24
In particular, Justice Stevens advocated that not all indecent and offensive
speech deserved the same level of protection as provided for in the past.125
In a series of cases following Erznoznik, the Court began to apply this
rationale and measure the value of the speech involved against the asserted
governmental interest, and began to sustain various ordinances prohibiting
offensive and indecent speech.'26 Pacifica, although a plurality opinion,
exemplifies the Court's invocation of the "lower value speech"
approach. 27 Pacifica involved the airing of a satiric monologue, "Filthy
Words," during an afternoon radio broadcast. 2 ' The monologue
contained profane language, which the FCC found patently offensive and
.
2 Id. at 213 (providing examples of nudity not obscene to children such as "film[s]
containing a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes from a culture
in which nudity is indigenous").
123 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
'
24 See GUNTHER, supra note 70, at 1146-54.
123 Id. at 1146. Acknowledging that such speech, unlike obscenity, is categorically
protected, Justice Stevens placed a lower value on offensive speech, and applied a balancing test
to determine whether the government could restrict it. Id.
12 6 See, e.g., Young v. Am.Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (holding that the
non-obscene, although erotic, speech in question here was not of the same value as political
speech, thus should be afforded a different degree of constitutional protection so long as the
governmental interest adequately supports the classification). There are "[certain] words [that]
offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends .... [They] are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value.., that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation 438 U.S. 726,746 (1978).1 See infra note 125 (discussing this approach).
'
28 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
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in violation of federal broadcasting standards.129 A father, who heard the
broadcast while he was driving with his young son, filed the initial
complaint against Pacifica Foundation with the FCC.1"0 Although the FCC
did not impose formal sanctions against Pacifica, it did require Pacifica to
air such satire at times when children would not be expected to be
listening to the radio."31 In sustaining the FCC's restriction, Justice
Stevens held that the language used by Carlin "lack[ed] literary, political,
[or] scientific value" and, therefore, was not worthy of the traditional First
Amendment protections that had been afforded to non-obscene speech.3 2
In reaching its decision, the Court looked at the circumstances surrounding
the use of the language. 33 Unlike Cohen and Erznoznik, the offensive
speech in question here invaded the privacy of individual homes.'34
Justice Stevens specifically concentrated on the accessibility of the
broadcast medium to children.3 5 He also noted that the time of day the
monologue was aired was emphasized by the FCC.136 Based on these
considerations, the Court found the FCC's mandate not to be
129 Id. (stating that Pacifica violated Title 18, United States Code, Section 1464,
which prohibited the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication"). Carlin's monologue discussed, in great detail, the seven words that could
never be used on the airwaves. They were: "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker,
and tits." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751.
130 Id. at 726 (explaining that the monologue aired over a radio station owned by
Pacifica Foundation).
131 Id. at 733 (explaining that the FCC "[did not] intend[] to place an absolute
prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather sought to channel it to times of
day when children most likely would not be exposed to it").
'32 Id. at 745-46 (applying the lower value speech approach, and finding Carlin's
language to be of a lesser value than other speech).
133 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747-48 (recognizing that "each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment problems") (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 502-03 (1952).
1 Id. at 748-50.
131 Id. at 749.
136Id. at 750.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
overreaching.' The FCC merely restricted speech in this case, it did not
proscribe it.' Moreover, Justice Stevens noted that the material in
question was still available to adults through other means.'39 In dissent,
Justice Brennan, in addition to declaring all non-obscene material
protected by the First Amendment, specifically noted the responsibility of
parents, rather than the government, to regulate what their children hear
or see.
140
4. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC'
In 1988, Congress amended the Communications Decency Act of
1934 in order to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial
telephone messages. 42 In Sable, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice White, upheld the provisions of the Act dealing with obscenity, in
accordance with the Court's long history of holding obscenity outside the
realm of constitutional protection.1 43 However, the Court, narrowing the
holding of Pacifica, refused to uphold the portion of the Act prohibiting
indecent speech, finding such speech constitutionally protected. '44 The
Court, finally forming a majority opinion as to the standard of review to
be applied, performed a strict scrutiny analysis. 141 The Court first
37Id. Challenges of vagueness and overbreadth were claimed by Pacifica Foundation,
however, Justice Stevens found the restriction not to "reduce adults to hearing only what is fit
for children." Id. n.28 (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
38 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745.
91d at 750 n.28 (commenting that adults could still purchase such material or view
and listen to such performances at theaters and nightclubs).
140 Id. at 769-70.
141492 U.S. 115 (1989).
142 Id. at 117-18.
143 Id. at 124.
'441d. at 126. The Court in Sable, acknowledging offensive and indecent speech as
constitutionally protected, provided a standard of review akin to due process and equal protection
analysis, in order to determine, on a case by case basis, whether the government could restrict
the offensive or indecent speech. Id.
552 [Vol XIV
19981 COMMUNICATIONS DECENCYACT 553
examined whether the governmental interest in protecting children from
indecent speech -- the hallmark of the dial-a-porn messages -- was
compelling, and secondly, whether the Act was narrowly tailored so that
it least restricted the First Amendment rights of adults.46 Although Justice
White acknowledged the compelling governmental interest in protecting
the sensibilities of children, the Court, nevertheless, found the indecency
provision of the Act overbroad in its attempt to protect children from
exposure to indecent speech.' 47 Because the Act placed a blanket ban on
a form of speech which could, through less restrictive means, such as
credit card authorization, access codes, or scrambling devices, safeguard
children from the effects of exposure, the Act could not survive strict
scrutiny.'48 Further distinguishing the restriction from that in Pacifica, the
Court noted that the accessibility of offensive material in Sable required
affirmative action by the recipient, thus removing the element of surprise
(i.e. lack of warning) that was dispositive in Pacifica. 1'49
5. Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC;50
and Alliance For Community Media v. FCC'
Recently, the Supreme Court heard arguments on two cases
challenging the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1996.152 Denver Area Consortium and Alliance for Community
145 Id. at 126 (providing that strict scrutiny review requires both a compelling
governmental interest in restricting speech and narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental
interest in order to pass constitutional muster).
14 Pacifica, 492 U.S. at 126.
1471Id. at 131.
1
48 Id. at 128, 131.
1491d. at 127-28 (stating that here "[tihere is no 'captive audience' problem ... callers
will generally not be unwilling listeners").
"0 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
. 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
"'
52 See generally Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 2377 (1996) (holding that sections 10(a), (b), and (c) of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 did not violate the First
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
Media raised challenges to three statutory provisions regulating the
broadcasting of "patently offensive" sex-related material on both leased
access television channels"' and public access television channels.'
The first provision, which allows for a cable system (i.e. operator)
to use its discretion in deciding whether or not to allow broadcast
programming that "describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or
organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary
community standards" on leased access channels, was declared
constitutional.'55 Justice Breyer analogized the case with Pacifica,
declaring "[c]able television is as easily 'accessible to children' as over-
the-air broadcasting." 5 6 Justice Breyer also found offensive material on
cable television to contain the privacy and surprise elements akin to
Pacifica.'57 Also, like Sable, Justice Breyer found the governmental
interest in protecting children from "patently offensive depictions of sex"
to be compelling.'58 The Court, thus, conducted the strict scrutiny analysis
like that in Sable, and found, unlike Sable, that the Government's means
of protecting children was truly the least restrictive infringement on the
First Amendment rights of cable operators and viewers.'59 The provision,
despite allowing cable operators the right to ban patently offensive
programming completely, also permits the rescheduling of such programs,
or even the choice to fully allow such programming, thus sufficiently
tailoring the statute. 60 Finally, Justice Breyer specifically noted the
Amendment of the United States Constituion); Alliance for Community Media v. F.C.C., 10
F.3d 812 (1993) (challenging the constitutionality of Sections 10(a), 10(b), and 10(c) of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992).
"5 Leased access television are channels reserved under federal law for commercial
lease by parties unaffiliated with the cable television system operator. Denver Area, 116 S.Ct
at 2381.
154 Id. Public access television are channels local governments require be dedicated
for public, educational, and governmental programming. Id.
"1 Id. at 2381, 2398.
116 Id. at 2386.
157 Id.
' DenverArea Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2378.
'
5 9 Id. at 2389.
'
60Id. at 2387.
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language of the statute, in that it specifically defined its terms, thus
rejecting any claim of vagueness. 6 The third provision, like the first, gave
cable operators the discretion whether or not to allow patently offensive
programming. 162 However, the third provision differed from the first in
that the third provision was applicable to public, educational, and
government access channels, but not leased access channels. 6 Applying
strict scrutiny, the Court found the restriction on speech to be an
unconstitutional infringement on the First Amendment rights of viewers
and programmers. 6 Because of the history of public access channels, as
well as the legislative history of the Act and the prior proceedings before
the FCC, the Court found this provision of the Act to be unnecessary to
protect children, and thus, inappropriately tailored to achieve that
interest."'
Likewise, the second provision, requiring leased channel operators
to separate and block patently offensive programming, was rejected.'66
The second provision was not sustained because it required, not merely
permitted, cable operators to restrict speech in a manner that was not the
least restrictive. 67 Justice Breyer, without discussing the constitutionality
of the alternatives available to cable operators, provided more narrowly
tailored means to further the government's interest in protecting
children. 68
161 Id. at 2390. Like Pacifica, Denver Area Consortium specifically measured
"patently offensive" by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, and
specifically listed that which was prohibited. Id.
16' 106 STAT. 1486, § 10(c ).
163 DenverArea Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2381.
16 Id. (striking down the second provision of the Act which required channel
operators to "segregate and to block.., patently offensive" programming).
165Id. at 2394 (holding that the provision was not "narrowly, or reasonably, tailored
... to protect children").
'6' 106 STAT. 1486, § 10(b).
'
6 DenverArea Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2391 (explaining that the second provision
failed strict scrutiny analysis because it was not narrowly tailored).
168 Id. at 2392 (providing scrambling, blocking, and the "V-chip" as less restrictive
means to prevent children from viewing inappropriate material, while still allowing cable
operators to carry the programming, thus protecting their First Amendment privilege).
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C. The Communications Decency Act of 1996
In performing "a word by word" examination of Section 223(a) of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996, it is difficult to decipher
permissible acts from acts which are criminal.'69 Such a discrepancy
strikes at the core of due process. Because vagueness in a criminal statute
inherently breeds discrimination, uncertainty, and inconsistency, it is
essential under our Constitution for not only the offender, but also for the
prosecutor, to know what is punishable under our laws. 70 Moreover,
when First Amendment infringement is placed at issue by a Congressional
statute, "stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be
applied to a statute" for such a law may stifle one of an individual's most
basic freedoms: his freedom of expression."'
Section 223(a) of the Act used the term "indecent" as the criterion
for establishing those communications that could not be transmitted
knowingly to a minor.72 In Section 223(d), Congress specifically defined
the first hurdle that any sender of material over the Internet must pass:
that is, the material could not be "offensive."'73 However, nowhere in the
text of the Act was the second criteria, "indecent," defined. 174 Moreover,
16 9ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 859 (explaining the requisite dissection necessary
to sustain a criminal statute challenged for vagueness).
'
70 d. at 860 (reiterating the settled principle that a narrow definition is required of all
terms of a statute, particularly one in which a violation may result in the loss of life, liberty or
property).
171 Id. at 860 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), explaining that "a
statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech" requires the most rigid of examination,
for the free exchange of ideas may be at stake).
172 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a).
173 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (defining "patently offensive" communication as that
communication which "depicts or describes.., sexual or excretory activities or organs" in the
context of "contemporary community standards"); see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 25-26 (setting
forth the some examples of material that a state, within its authority, may find obscene).
174 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223. The Government argued, and the Conference Reports
suggested, that the two terms were intended to apply interchangeably. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at
850,861-62. In Pacifica, and other landmark cases, the term "indecent" has specifically been
defined by contemporary community standards. See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732. Section
223(a) of the Communications Decency Act, however, made no such reference to community
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previous Supreme Court cases which placed the terms "indecent" and
"patently offensive" at issue, were limited only to the fields of public
theater, broadcasting, and telephone communications, never exploring the
world of cyberspace. 75 Therefore, in the world of cyberspace, what is
"indecent?"'76  How is "patently offensive" to be measured?'" The
dispersing of material in cyberspace, in effect, cuts down community
borders making community standards a single standard rather than
different in each community.'78 Although the Act specified "contemporary
community standards," a general content provider would actually have to
apply the law of the most restrictive community in order to avoid the risk
of criminal prosecution.'79 Therefore, what line may not be crossed,
whereby misjudgment could result in imprisonment? 80 Opponents
claimed that the Act was so potentially overbroad and inconsistent in its
application, for it would not have just limited adults to that which is
suitable for kids, but it could have gone so far as to infringe upon material
that is protected even for children.' 8' Congress's use of the undefined
standards. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 862-63.
175 See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726; Sable, 492 U.S. 115; Denver Area
Consortium, 116 S. Ct. 2374.
176 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 864 (inquiring whether contributions to art, politics,
education, and health such as "artistic photographs of a nude man with an erect penis, depictions
of Indian statues portraying different methods of copulation, or the transcript of a scene from a
contemporary play about AIDS could be considered 'indecent' under the Act").
177 Id.
171 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 936; see also Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 855.
179 Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 937. The New York Court, however, found this line of
argument unpersuasive. Id. The Court found "no basis for concluding that Internet content
providers are any less capable than those subject to obscenity laws or other indecency restrictions
to acquire a general familiarity with the relevant standards." Id. However, the Court did not
dismiss, nor address, the possibility of overbreadth regarding this issue. Id. at 938. The
Pennsylvania Court, however, did address this area of overbreadth and found the requirement
of tailoring communications to the most restrictive community unconstitutionally overbroad.
See also Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 855.
'847 U.S.C.A. §§ 223(a) and (d) (providing that any violation of these sections could
result in a fine, or imprisonment up to two years, or both).
... In Erznoznik, Justice Powell said, "[cilearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene
even as to minors." 422 U.S. at 213.
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term "indecent" could actually have made discussions of art, politics, and
news, felonious acts.' It was the subjectivity of the Act, according to
Judge Buckwalter in ACLU, that made Sections 223(a) and 223(d)'8 3 So
dangerous to an individual's liberty." 4 Due process does not permit such
subjectivity.'85 Nonetheless, the New York District Court in Shea sharply
disagreed with the Pennsylvania Court's struggle with the terms "indecent"
and "patently offensive."'86 The Shea Court found the terms well defined
by Court of Appeals and Supreme Court precedent irrespective of the
viewing or listening medium.' The New York Court found implicit in
Pacifica a "generic definition of 'indecent'... capable of surviving a
vagueness challenge."' 88
What the New York District Court and the Pennsylvania District
Court did agree on was the overreach of the Statute.'89 That is, Sections
223(a) and 223(d) of the Act could have had the effect of restricting
speech that is constitutionally protected to adults. 9 ° The plaintiffs in both
ACLU and Shea argued that the Communications Decency Act of 1996
placed a restriction on speech that has been declared constitutionally
protected. 9' Therefore, the Act must survive strict scrutiny or fall.'92 In
other words, the Act must be justified by a compelling government
interest, one which must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected
rights, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest."'
In Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 845.
1' See supra note 56.
18 4 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 864-65.
See Shea, 930 F.Supp. at 936.
See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 936.
187 
Id.
'
8 Id. at 935.
'
89 Id. at 936. Although the New York District Court did not find Section 223(d)
unconstitutionally vague, the court, like the Pennsylvania District Court, found the Section an
unconstitutional infringement on the First Amendment rights of adults. Id. at 935-41.
9 Id. at 937-38; see also Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 855.
'
91 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 854; see also Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 922.
192 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940 (applying strict scrutiny analysis like that performed
in Denver Area Consortium).
'
93 Id. at 939.
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Specifically, the Act must have been written so that it would least impair
an individual's freedom of speech while still promoting the compelling
governmental interest.'94
Before performing such a test, however, the medium must be
established.'95 Because "an Internet user must act affirmatively and
deliberately to retrieve specific information online" the Pennsylvania
District Court equated the medium of cyberspace to telephone
communication, thus holding Sable the applicable law.'96 In Sable, the
Court found the blanket ban over dial-a-pom messages to be a broad
restriction in violation of the First Amendment.'97 However, the Court
noted that narrower restrictions on the First Amendment rights of adults
would be permissible so long as the government's interest was compelling
and the narrower restrictions were the most tailored to further that
governmental interest.'98 Therefore, assuming a compelling governmental
interest, the suggested means mentioned by the Court in Sable may have
been applicable here.'99 Moreover, because accessibility of cyberspace
occurs predominantly via the personal computer, the "invasion of the
home" element of Pacifica was also applicable, thus, paving the way for
a significant restriction on the communications at issue here.2"'
'94 Id. at 940.
IS' See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742 (discussing the importance of context in
determining whether speech may be restricted).
196 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 851-52. Accessing information on the Internet, like
dialing a telephone, requires knowledge of who or what you are contacting and a conscious
decision to reach that person or site, thus eliminating or at least significantly reducing the
surprise factor significant in Pacifica. See generally Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28.
'
97 Id. at 130-31.1981d. at 126.
199 Sable, 492 U.S. at 126-28. Courts have always found the protection of children
from offensive, thus damaging, material to be a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Id.,
at 126 (extending the interest "to shielding minors from the influence of [material] that is not
obscene by adult standards" but only permitting government infringement if the means chosen
were narrowly tailored to further this interest). The Court offered credit card, access code, and
scrambling rules, but not blanket restriction, as satisfactory solutions to the problem of keeping
indecent dial-a-porn messages out of the reach of minors. Id. at 128.
200 See generally FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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Section 223(e) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
provided a "safe harbor" defense, which the Government contended
narrowly tailors the Act.2 ' That section provided, in pertinent part, that:
It is a defense to a prosecution... that a person has taken,
in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate
actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent
access by minors to a[n] [indecent] communication...
which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict
minors from such communications, including any method
which is feasible under available technology; or has
restricted access to such communication by requiring use
of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code,
or adult personal identification number 202
Thus, the Government claimed that the Act, unlike Sable, was not a
complete ban on offensive and indecent material; but instead, was
narrowly tailored to restrict children's access to inappropriate material,
while least restricting adult access.20 3 However, petitioners ACLU and
Shea countered that the defense provided for in the Act is technologically
impossible in most cases, thus leaving content providers with two options:
censor your speech, or face criminal liability. 20 4 In Sable, the Court found
such an ultimatum an impermissible restriction on speech.205 The New
York and Pennsylvania District Courts agreed likewise, finding the
defenses provided in the Act unfeasible in the world of cyberspace.20 6 In
both cases, there was significant testimony regarding the many solutions
offered by the government (i.e. age verification,2 7 credit card
20' 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(A)(B).
202 Id.
' See generally Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824; see also generally Shea, 930 F. Supp. 916.
2 See generallyReno, 929 F. Supp. 824; see also generally Shea, 930 F. Supp. 916.
2oS Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
2 6Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 856-57; see also Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 948-50.
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verification,208 adult password verification,2 9 or tagging 210), and each
opinion detailed the feasibility of such solutions.211 Both district courts
concluded that each "solution" was not workable.212 Moreover, foreign
providers, who are believed to account for over forty percent of content
on the Internet, would still have the potential to circumvent the
solutions.213
Opponents of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 feel the
207 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 845 (stating that there is not presently "a reliable way to
ensure that recipients and participants in [newsgroups or chat rooms] can be screened for age").
"[T]he identification systems ha[ve] no practical application for Internet activities like chat rooms
and news groups in which participants talk to one another. Forty million people use such
interactive formats... in contrast with the 100,000 Web sites for which screening techniques
might be feasible.". Greenhouse, supra note 6, at BI 0.
2 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 845-46 (stating that "[v]erification of a credit card number
over the Internet is not now technically possible" due to the insecure nature of the Internet).
Verification actually occurs off-line and there was no evidence submitted that a verification
agency would process a credit card without a commercial transaction. Id. Even assuming
arguendo that a verification agency would process a credit card without a transaction, the fee
of such a service multiplied with the number of visitors to a web site - particularly a non-
commercial web site - would make such a screening device economically impossible for the
provider. Id. Moreover, underlying the notion of credit card verification lies the false
assumption that every adult possesses a credit card. Id.
209 Greenhouse, supra note 6, at B10 (reporting the Deputy Solicitor General's
assertion that identification cards are available for as little as five dollars per year). However,
such cards are ineffective in the e-mail and chat room fora. Id.
210 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847 (stating that tagging would involve "requir[ing] all
content providers that post arguably 'indecent' material to review all of their online content").
Such a proposal would be "extremely burdensome." Id. To avoid the cost "of reviewing each
file individually, a content provider could tag its entire site but this would prevent minors from
accessing much material that is not 'indecent' under the [Act]." Id. at 847-48. Moreover, there
is no evidence that such a label or tag would actually block transmissions, thus, such a task is
actually an exercise in futility. Id. at 847.
2 Id. at 845-48; see also Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942-47.
212Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 858; see also Shea 930 F. Supp. at 948.
2
,
3Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 848-49. However, the Supreme Court did not give much
weight to this factor because the United States could pave the way for other countries to follow
when it comes to public policy. Greenhouse, supra note 6, at B10.
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best answer lies in user-based technology. 214 Such technology eliminates
the government's role in regulating speech that has already been
determined constitutionally protected, and gives parents control over what
their children see.2"5 Many software companies market software at
reasonable prices1 6 that empower adults to limit the Internet access of
children. 7 Such software is designed to enable parents to filter out
material and selectively block access to communications they feel are
inappropriate for their children, while still allowing them unimpeded
access.
218
IV. RENO V. ACLU
219
On March 19, 1997, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments on the Communications Decency Act of 1996.220 The primary
concern of the Court appeared to be the availability of technology to filter
or mark material not suitable for children and the cost of such technology
to both commercial and non-commercial providers.22' In other words, the
Court appeared to be focusing on whether the defenses provided for in
14See plaintiffs complaint at 2,American LibraryAssoc. v. U.S. (No. 96-1458); see
also Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842, 883 (discussing user-based technology).
2' Melvin, supra note 1, at 5D (discussing how several on-line services now "offer
controls that can block out information parents don't want children to see").
"" See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 839-842 (listing prices ranging from twenty dollars to
sixty dollars for such software, and reporting that several major providers offer parental control
options free of charge to their members).
217 Id. at 842 (stating that "although parental control software currently can screen for
certain suggestive words or for known sexually explicit sites, it cannot now screen for sexually
explicit images unaccompanied by suggestive text unless those who configure the software are
aware of the particular site").
2 1 8 Id.
219 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
220See Reno v. ACLU -- Transcript of Supreme Court OralArgument (visited
Mar. 24, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/sctran.html.>. The Government
in the Pennsylvania case appealed directly to the Supreme Court as per 104 Pub.L. §
561(b) (providing a right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court for any Constitutional
challenge to the Communications Decency Act of 1996).
.. Id.at 2-4, 13-15, 17-22.
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Section 223(e) of the Act were feasible, thus, making the Act the least
restrictive means of furthering the government's interest."' According to
respondents' attorney, Bruce J. Ennis, the available technology that
screens for children remains either prohibitively expensive for non-
commercial sites or impractical for Internet activities in which participants
talk to one another.223 The answer, according to Mr. Ennis, is contained
in the less restrictive alternative of allowing parents to limit their children's
Internet access.224
Additionally, Justice Souter raised an interesting issue that
appeared to surprise Government attorney, Seth P. Waxman. Justice
Souter inquired as to whether Section 223(d) of the Act could make
criminals out of parents who make the Internet available to their children,
since that section prohibited the knowing use of a computer to display
patently offensive material in a manner available to a child.225 Mr.
Waxman conceded that the Act could be interpreted in that manner and
invited the Court to alter Section 223(d) to exempt parents (in that
situation) from liability. 226
In light of Denver Area Consortium,227 it was difficult to predict
22 2 Id.
223 Id. at 16-19.
224 Id. at 22 (providing that user technology exists, that not only circumvents the
deficiencies of the Act (i.e. its overbreadth, its potential restriction on material that is not
indecent, its failure to account for the influx of indecent and obscene foreign communications,
the financial burdens and technological concerns it imposes), but it also protects children more
effectively). But see also id. at 14 (providing the Government's response to whether the use of
such parental software was a defense under the Act). The Government claimed that available
parental control software was not capable of keeping up with the plethora of material that is
rapidly increasing, thus, use of such software was insufficient to constitute a defense under the
Act. Id. Moreover, Justice Kennedy expressed concern over protecting children who do not
have parents available to restrict their access to inappropriate material. Id. at 29.
'Reno v. ACLU -- Transcript of Supreme Court OralArgument (visited Mar. 24,
1997) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/sctran.html.>. at 10-12.
22 Id. at 12. Of equal concern to Justice Breyer was the notion of prosecuting teen-
agers who converse over the Internet about their "sexual experiences.., real or imagined," and
subjecting them to two years imprisonment. Id. at 7.
'
7See generally DenverArea Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2385 & 2397-98 (sustaining
a very narrow restriction on speech in the context of leased access television).
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how the Supreme Court would rule on the Communications Decency Act
of 1996. At oral argument, the Court appeared to steer away from the
issue of vagueness.228 However, it was certainly possible for the Court to
find the terms of the Act impermissibly vague, and thus, in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court could have
required Congress to better define the language of the Act, specifically,
how the term "indecent" should be measured and applied, in order to
prevent subjectivity, discrimination, and inconsistency in prosecutions
under the Act.' Most importantly, however, the Court had to determine
the context of cyberspace in order to apply the proper standard of review
previously set forth in the broadcast medium cases, as well as the public
theater and telephone communication cases, to determine whether the Act
was an impermissible restriction on the First Amendment rights of
Reno v. ACLU -- Transcript of Supreme Court Oral Argument (visited Mar. 24,
1997) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/trial/sctran.html.> at 21-22. However, Justice
O'Connor did state that "[tihe Act just isn't specific." Id. at 21.
'gSee, e.g., H.R. 3089, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (proposing an amendment to
the Act, sponsored by House Representative Anna Eshoo, entitled the "Online Parental Control
Act of 1996").
The proposal, in pertinent part, amended Section 223(a) of the Act and replaced the
term "indecent" with "harmful to minors." Also amended was Section 223(d), replacing
"patently offensive" with "hanful to minors" and defining "harmful to minors" as any "sexually
explicit matter" which meets all of the following criteria:
a) Considered as a whole, the matter appeals to the prurient interest of minors.
b) The matter is patently offensive as determined by contemporary local community
standards in terms of what is suitable for minors.
c) Considered as a whole, the matter lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
educational, or scientific value for minors."
Finally amended was Section 223(e), which added, in pertinent part, that any person,
who has, "in good faith-labeled such communications as inappropriate for minors, placed such
communications in a segregated access site identified as inappropriate for minors, or otherwise
established a mechanism... enabl[ing] such communications to be automatically blocked or
screened by software or other capabilities reasonably available to responsible adults wishing to
effect such blocking or screening" shall not be held civilly or criminally liable for making
available to a minor a communication that is harmful to minors. Id.
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adults.23° Nearly fifty years ago, in Kovacs v. Cooper,23' Justice Jackson
wrote that "[t]he moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the
handbill, the sound truck and the street comer orator have differing
natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each [means of expression] is a law
unto itself ..... ,232 The Court could have even applied a new standard of
review due to the unique nature of the Internet.233
On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court rendered its decision on the
constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.234 In a 7-2
decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Pennsylvania District Court
decision and struck down the Communications Decency Act of 1996 as
unconstitutional.235 Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens
afforded speech on the Internet the highest level of First Amendment
protection, similar to that given to books and newspapers.236 Justice
Stevens, finding the Internet not to be as pervasive a medium as television
likened the restrictions of the Communications Decency Act to "the ban
on 'dial-a-pom' invalidated in Sable Communications of California, Inc.
v. FCC."2 7 Because of the active search that is required of Internet users
230 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (stating that "each medium of expression presents
special First Amendment problems"). Justice Stevens, in Pacifica, recognized that the
monologue that could be restricted in Pacifica, "[might] be protected in other contexts." Id. at
746.
231 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
"Id. at 97. See Linda Greenhouse, What Level of Protection for Internet Speech?,
N.Y. TIMEs, March 24, 1997, at D5 (quoting the excerpt from Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion).
233 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830 (discussing how "the exponentially growing,
worldwide medium that is the Internet... presents unique issues relating to the application of
First Amendment jurisprudence and due process requirements.. ).
214 See generally Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997) (consolidating ACLU v. Reno and
Shea v. Reno).
'5Id. at 2333,2351. The majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens and signed
by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, Souter and Thomas. Justice O'Connor wrote
a separate opinion signed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Id.
236 See Linda Greenhouse, Decency Act Fails, Effort to Shield Minors Is Said to
Infringe the First Amendment, N. Y. TIMEs, June 27, 1997, at Al (analyzing the decision).237Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2346 & n.40.
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in order to be subjected to indecent material, Sable was most applicable.23
Despite finding the protection of children a compelling
governmental purpose, Justice Stevens, applying the rationale of Sable,
found the defense provided for in the Act not to be sufficiently tailored so
that adult access to constitutionally protected material was least
restricted.239 In most cases, individuals would truly have been left with
only one option - censorship. The Constitution requires a less restricti&e
option. Because the Government failed to proffer any less restrictive
alternative than those offered in Section 223(e), the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 could not be sustained.24
The majority also found "singularly unpersuasive" the
Government's position that the Act is necessary because content on the
Internet is "driving countless citizens away from the medium because of
the risk of exposing themselves or their children to harmful material."241
The Court found growth on the Internet to be so exponential that it should
be "presume[d] that governmental regulation of the content of speech is
more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage
it.""" Justice Stevens found that "the interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven
benefit of censorship. ,2
43
As to whether the Act was so vague that it violated the Fifth
Amendment, the Court found the terms indecent and patently offensive,
as used in the Act, to be unconstitutionally vague.244 The Court found that
under the terms of the Communications Decency Act, there was "a greater
threat of censoring speech that, in fact, falls outside the statute's scope.
Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably
silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional
23 Id. at 2343 (quoting Sable, 127 S.Ct. 115, 127-28 (1989)).
"' Id. at 2348.
240 See generally Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 2349-50 (1997).
"Ild. at 2351.
242 Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2351 (rejecting the Government's argument that indecent
material will stunt the growth of the Internet).
243 Id.
2
" Id. at 2344, 2446.
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protection." '245 Justice Stevens added, "[Such a] burden... cannot be
justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute."246
In a separate opinion written by Justice O'Connor and signed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the two Justices concurred with most of the
majority's opinion but dissented in regard to a portion of Section 223(a).247
Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist found this section not to be
unconstitutional in all cases.248 Because Section 223(a) forbade those
transmissions knowingly sent to a recipient who is under eighteen, the
Justices found that Section 223(a) would not be overreaching in the case
of a one to one - adult to child - transmission, or a transmission from one
adult to an otherwise all children audience.249 The dissenting opinion
analogized this specific audience theory with the Court's decision in
Ginsberg v. New York.25 In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court sustained a
New York law that barred store owners from selling pornographic
magazines to minors.25' The Court upheld such a ban primarily because
it did not infringe upon an adult's ability to purchase the same.252 The law
simply created "adult zones" that only restricted a child's access.253 In
Reno, however, the dissenters agreed with the majority's view that such
zones are generally not feasible in the world of cyberspace because of the
virtual impossibility and impracticability of keeping children from indecent
transmissions while still allowing adults unimpeded access. 254  But,
Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist found the specific audience exceptions
not to be overreaching, because, in those scenarios, no two adults would
be in communication, therefore, no adult would be deprived of receiving
material from another adult or sending to another adult material that which
'4sId. at 2346.
246 /d.
247 Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2351-53.
248 Id. at 2354.
249 Id. at 2355.
2s Id. at 2353.
251 id.
252 Id.
23Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2353.
2
54 Id.
568 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol XIV
he/she is constitutionally permitted to send.255 The specific audience
exceptions create a constitutionally permissible zone for children where
adults may not transmit indecent material.256 Nevertheless, this position
did not receive the support of the majority.257
V. CONCLUSION
In his dissent in Pacifica, Justice Brennan stressed "the time-
honored right of a parent to raise his child as he sees fit. .... ""' On
February 8, 1996, President Clinton and Congress attempted to thrash this
right. The Communications Decency Act of 1996 blatantly displayed a
hypocritical lack of confidence in the family values of America that
President Clinton so vehemently stressed in his election campaign. There
is little doubt that certain material is best left to an adults-only audience,
however, it is still for Mom and Dad, in the first place, to decide what their
child should see and read. After all, as Justice Brennan conveyed in
Pacifica, some parents may actually find it healthy to expose their children
to material that others find inappropriate. Such exposure, if effectuated
in a manner that a parent sees fit, has the ability to "defuse the taboo" that
often inappropriately surrounds such material.259 That decision is a
parent's natural right. On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court honored this
right. 260
25 Id. at 2354-55.
256 1d.
17 Id. at 2356 (stating, "[tihe Court reaches a contrary conclusion, and from that holding that
I respectfully dissent").
258 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 769 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"9 Id. at 770.
26
°See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. at 2341. In reaching its decision, the Court
acknowledged its consistent recognition of the principle that "the parents' claim to authority in
their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."
Id. " It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Id. at n.31. Immediately following the decision, President Clinton
stated "he would convene industry executives and groups representing parents, teachers and
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Nathan M Semmel
librarians to seek a solution to the problem of on-line pornographic material." See John M.
Broder, Clinton Readies New Approach on Smut, N. Y. TIMEs, June 27, 1997 at A21.

